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[W]hen sociological observers began to enter the places where scientific
knowledge is produced, the laboratory, they found many practices that seemed
to share more with daily life outside the lab than with the strict edicts governing
knowledge in science, such as universality, objectivity, or reproducibility.
Measurement ... might be based on a very unclear ... consensus. Techniques
might be developed in local settings and depend on local materials and
practices. . . . The establishment of findings in the laboratory as facts accepted
by the wider scientific community might tum out to be in large part a social
process ... of gaining credibility .... 1

An idealized description of scientific activity persists in law and in
legal literature. From the Daubert four-part test, formulated in 1993* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University. The author is grateful to the
Frances Lewis Law Center both for providing a summer 2001 research stipend and for
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1. EMILY MARTIN, F'LExIBLE BODIES: TRACKING IMMUNITY IN AMERICAN
CULTURE-FROMTHEDAYSOFPOLIOTOTHEAGEOFAIDS 6 (1994).
2. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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science is (i) testable, (ii) with a low error rate, (iii) usually published,
and (iv) generally accepted3-to the new Federal Rule of Evidence
702-scientific testimony is based on sufficient data and is the product
of reliable methods 4-the social embeddedness of science is virtually
ignored in favor of a "core" or "bottom-line" summary description.
Even when decidedly social aspects of the scientific enterprise-for
example, funding bias, fraud, and governing research paradigms-are
acknowledged, they are seemingly viewed as fleeting and irrelevant to
the project of defining "science."5 There is little attention paid to the
inevitable, not anomalous, institutional and rhetorical features of modem
science. The purpose of this Article is to explore that deficiency, explain
how some science studies scholars investigate social embeddedness, and
suggest how judges and attorneys might view science differently in light
of such studies.
The distinction between inevitable and anomalous social features of
science is not always clear. For example, language itself is necessary to
science, but the particular, dominant style of "agentless prose" 6 among
scientists is arguably subject to critique and transformation. While rhetoric
and persuasion are inevitable features in the production of scientific
knowledge, a particular scientific community's research standard for
required precision may, following criticism, change. 7 Complicating the
distinction, some features of science, like a particular community's
research standard in my last example, might be viewed by scientists as
subject to change but not anomalous. That is, the precision requirement
is viewed as good for science. Thus the institutionalization and
professionalization of modem science, to the extent that its particular
Id. at 593-94.
FED. R. Evm. 702.
5. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A
Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1563 (2000). Beecher-Monas begins
her "primer" with a strong acknowledgment of science as culture-bound, id. at 1576, but
then the elements of her "heuristic" are reduced to hypothesis, data, inferences,
methodology, and probable conclusion, id. at 1589-90.
6. See David Locke, Voices of Science, 67 AM. SCHOLAR 103, 104 (1998) ("That
official language of science-policed by the referees and editorial boards of scientific
publications-is what English teachers call agentless prose; that is, there is no designated
agent for any of the actions it describes."); see also TERRY THREADGOLD, FEMINIST
POETICS: POIESIS, PERFORMANCE, HISTORIES 16-34 (1997). Threadgold traces in the
history of science
the gradual disappearance of the embodied masculine subject of science from
the scene of his scientific activities ....
The generic organisation of the scientific article and the business of
citation now functions, disembodied and desexed ... [to hide] a profoundly
embodied and disciplined process, subject to all kinds of policy, institutional,
private and power relationships ....
Id. at 21-22.
7. See infra notes 30, 38.

3.
4.
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"Authority Structure" and "Reward System'' is not inevitable, is
arguably necessary for science to flourish. 8 Nevertheless, a distinction
should be made between inevitable social features-cognitive limitations,
communal standards and conventions, shared language, and
institutionalization-and those that are not integral to science-fraud,9 the
public's ideology, 10 the effect of business interests, 11 political influence, 12
ethical limitations,13 or a combination of the foregoing. 14 The latter
anomalous or eliminable features of science, or ''junk" science, are
clearly acknowledged and are part of legal discourse. In my emphasis
on the inevitable features of science, I am neither claiming generally that
they are good for science, because they make good science possible, nor
that they challenge the status of science because scientific knowledge is
merely a narrative or a social construction. Rather, I think an
8. See David Goodstein & James Woodward, Inside Science, 68 AM. SCHOLAR 83
(1999). "[T]he basic outlines of the social organization of science emerged almost as
soon as science did . . . . It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that science cannot existcertainly cannot flourish-without the Reward System and the Authority Structure." Id.
at 90. The "Reward System" is collectively "[t]he various means by which scientists
express admiration and esteem for their colleagues," which system is guided and
controlled by the Authority Structure; "[t]he goals of those in the Authority Structure are
power and influence." Id. at 84.
9. See Daniel S. Greenberg, Turning Science Into Gold, WASH. POST, Nov. 30,
1999, at A29 (discussing a "review of a series of drug tests [that] concluded that
favorable results were puffed up through repetition in various publications, while
negative information was played down or ignored").
10. See John McCarron, Science Takes a Back Seat to Ideology, Cm. TRIB., Apr.
24, 2000, § l, at 13 (criticizing "democratized science;" public hearing on vaccination
endorsed by American Academy of Pediatrics allows suspicious citizens to overturn
scientific experts).
11. See Eric Pianin, Dioxin Report by EPA on Hold: Industries Oppose Finding of
Cancer Link, Urge Delay, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2001, at Al (chemical, beef, and
poultry industries challenge EPA study as "not based on science"); see also Michael
Stem, Raiders of the Lost Genome, AM. LAWYER, Feb. 2001, at 77 ("[T]he market
economy . . . always makes the question of who owns what more important than who
knows what.") (reviewing KEVIN DAVIES, CRACKING THE GENOME (2000)).
12. See Pianin, supra note 11, at Al (''The Bush Administration has challenged
several Clinton-era environmental and public health rules and initiatives-including a
tough new standard for arsenic in drinking water--on the grounds they weren't
scientifically sound and would cause economic hardship to industry and local
governments.").
13. See Rick Weiss, Bush Administration Order Halts Stem Cell Meeting, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 2001, at A2 (discussing ethical and theological concerns over stem cell
research).
14. See Barron Lerner, Body Politics: How Public Pressure, Private Interests and
Powerful Lobbies Infect the Treatment of Breast Cancer, WASH. POST, HEALTH MAG.,
May 22, 2001, at 14.
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acknowledgment of and discourse concerning the inevitable social
features of science would lead to a more accurate conception of how
science works and, in particular cases, could lead to novel lines of critical
inquiry on the part of lawyers, judges, and juries concerning some
scientific controversies, some scientific theories, and some scientists. In
short, the inevitable social aspects of science are neither good nor bad in
general, but understanding their role in the production of scientific
knowledge provides another potential basis to challenge or defend expert
scientific testimony in certain cases. Just as a large payment to an expert
to testify is not necessarily indicative of bias, but might signal either bias
or credibility (for example, success, reputation, and authority) in particular
cases, evidence concerning cognitive limitations, standards as to what is
worth investigating, governing metaphors, dominant theoretical models,
and institutional gatekeeping within science might signal innocent bias or,
conversely, frameworks establishing credibility, in particular cases.
In Part I, I confirm the idealizations of science in law and their
implications for legal scholarship and practice. In Part II, I describe the
ethnographic method used by science studies scholars, with reference to
my own ethnographic analysis of interviews with three neuroscientists. I
conclude Part II by identifying various social aspects of science that
comprise a complex picture of scientific activity. In Part ill, I discuss
the implications of ethnomethodology for trial practice, including
deposition analysis, Daubert-type hearings, cross-examination techniques,
and drafting jury instructions. Part IV addresses anticipated criticisms of
my arguments.
I. IDEALIZING SCIENCE
"Scientists such as Wolpert happily acknowledge that science
is a social activity. Every practicing scientist is acutely aware of
it. How could one not be? All he wishes to deny is that 'science
15
is merely a social construct with little special validity. '"
Everybody, it seems, is willing to acknowledge the social character of
scientific activity. 16 The real issue is whether the social features of

15. David L. Hull, The Professionalization of Science Studies: Cutting Some Slack,
15 BIOLOGY & PHIL. 61, 85 (2000) (citation omitted) (quoting Lewis Wolpert, Response
to Fuller, 24 Soc. STUD. SCI. 745, 745 (1994)).
16. See Philip Kitcher, A Plea for Science Studies, in A HOUSE BUILT ON SAND:
EXPOSING POSTMODERNIST MYTHS ABOUT SCIENCE 36 (Noretta Koertge ed., 1998).
Although some idealized treatments of science proceed as if inquiry were
carried out by subjects who were disembodied, logically omniscient, and
alone, everybody knows better. . . . Those who want to slight the ... thesis
[that science is done by cognitively limited beings in social groups with
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science make a significant difference in terms of scientific reliability and
success. 17 While there may be a perceived risk in the fields of the
history, philosophy, and sociology of science (i) that attention to the
socio-historical aspects of science might eclipse our notions of scientific
progress, predictive success, canons of reason and evidence, and the
existence of theory-independent entities, 18 or (ii) that emphasizing power
relations, boundary work, 19 institutional arrangements, and governing
discourse might render scientists' own internal accounts (of their work
as pragmatic, approximate, evidence-relational, and model-based)
superfluous, 20 I do not believe there is any such danger in law. Given the
reliance on science by legal institutions, the risk is instead that realist or
rationalist and internal scientific perspectives will dominate legal
discourse.
Examples of idealizations of science include the Daubert four-part
test, 21 the 2000 amendment commentary to Federal Rule of Evidence
702,22 and much of the recent scholarship on law and science to the
complicated structures and long histories] surely do not contest these points
but, rather, deny that they have any impact on the practice of science....
[However,] individual and group histories and/or social roles make a
difference to scientific work.

Id.

17.
18.

Id.
See id. at 34-38. Critics of science studies "are broadly right to recognize a
persistent danger of overemphasizing the [socio-historical features of science] and
ignoring [its realist-rationalist features]." Id. at 38.
19. See Michael M. J. Fischer, Eye(l)ing the Sciences and Their Signijiers
(Language, Tropes, Autobiographers): InterViewing for a Cultural Studies of Science
and Technology, in TECHNOSCIENTIFIC IMAGINARIES: CONVERSATIONS, PROFILES, AND
MEMOIRS 43, 60 (George E. Marcus ed., 1995) [hereinafter TECHNOSCIENTIFIC
IMAGINARIES] (describing "the ways in which scientific knowledge polices its own
boundaries against new ideas or new information that it cannot easily incorporate"); see
also Charles Kester, The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science and the Troubles of
Translation: Defining the Proper Role for Scientific Evidence of Causation, 74 NEB. L.
REV. 529, 548-50 (1995). Scientists "use boundary work to self-define their community
and maintain consensus among the members of that community." Id. at 548.
20. See Fischer, supra note 19, at 59-64 (noting temptation to ignore accounts of
science by scientists themselves in favor of a social constructivist, political mediationist,
or narrative-theoretical account; each account is valid to a point but "dangerous if
allowed to silence the other perspectives") (citing DONNA HARAWAY, PRIMATE VISIONS:
GENDER, RACE, AND NATURE IN THE WORLD OF MODERN SCIENCE (1989)).
21. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)
(stating scientific knowledge is testable, with a low error rate, and is usually peerreviewed and generally accepted).
22. See AMENDMENTS TO FED. R. Evm., H.R. Doc. No. 106-225, at 41 (2000)
(stating that scientific knowledge is admissible by expert testimony "if (1) the testimony
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extent that authors emphasize core aspects of science as the most
significant for admissibility assessments. 23 Core features of science
include (i) the scientific hypothesis or theory (or "testable theory"), (ii)
scientific data, (iii) reliable testing or methodology, including standards
and controls to ensure a low error rate, and (iv) a conclusion, or probable
conclusion, with explanatory power. Each of these features of science
has an obvious anchor in nature or reality-(i) theories are formulated
with reference to perceived reality, (ii) the data is a representation of
natural phenomena, (iii) the methodology is how the data is handled, and
(iv) the probable conclusion should lead to explanatory power and
success. However, each of the core features of science also has an
anchor in social structures-(i) theories reflect personal and communal
beliefs and values as to what is important or worth studying,24 which
beliefs and values have a histo~ and refer back to earlier research,
institutional training, and professionalization of scientists; 26 (ii)
observation of data is mediated by cognitive capacity and theoretical
presuppositions (hence the term "theory-laden observation," which
suggests the researcher is looking for some things but not for others);27
(iii) methodology also has a social histo~ of experimental conventions,
and may vary among fields of research; 2 measurement technology and
inscription devices also have a social history related to available
resources and theoretical paradigms;29 and (iv) even conclusions are
made with reference to acceptabilicy standards, arising from the history
of research and practical demands. 30 Such social aspects are not, or
is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods
reliably to the facts of the case").
23. See, e.g., Beecher-Monas, supra note 5, at 1576, 1589-90; see also David S.
Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of Expertise
and lnterdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 51 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 685, 741-43 (2000)
(discussing a variety of approaches).
24. See David Goodstein, How Science Works, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 67, 70 (2d ed. 2000). "At the most fundamental level, it is
impossible to observe nature without having some reason to choose what is worth
observing and what is not worth observing." Id.
25. See Kitcher, supra note 16, at 36.
26. See Goodstein, supra note 24, at 75-77.
27. See id. at 70 (''Popper believed all science begins with a prejudice, or perhaps
more politely, a theory or hypothesis.").
28. See id. (''We don't really know what the scientific method is."); see also Gary
Edmond, Judicial Representations of Scientific Evidence, 63 MOD. L. REV. 216, 220
(2000) ("There is no universal scientific method determining every aspect of scientific
practice.").
29. See MARTIN, supra note 1, at 6.
30. See Kitcher, supra note 16, at 37 ("[T]he practical demands and the history of
research standards also help determine what will count as acceptable solutions, specifying,
for example, the precision that an answer must achieve if it is to be applicable.").
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should not be, particularly controversial, but they are often not identified
and discussed as significant in idealized accounts of science. When the
U.S. Supreme Court, in Daubert, defined science as involving testable
theories, a low error rate, peer review and publication, and general
acceptance,31 those elements became topics of discussion in legal
scholarship, bar journals, and continuing legal education. Lawyers and
judges, quite naturally, focused their attention on these aspects of
science in matters of admissibility of expert testimony.
Significantly, the last two features of the Daubert four-part test-peer
review and publication, and general acceptance32-identify social
aspects of scientific activity. They are not, however, on the same level
as testability and low error rate, which are considered to be the markers
of valid science.33 Most of the time, Justice Blackmun opined, valid
theories will be the product of the peer review and publication process,
and will attain general acceptance-those that are not published or
generally accepted should be viewed with suspicion.34 Social aspects of
science are thereby downplayed, and the opportunity is missed for a
critical discourse concerning the institutional and rhetorical characteristics of
peer review and publication, and general acceptance.
The idealized or core account of science is illustrated in Diagram I.
Again, this picture of science, in law, leads judges and lawyers, and
therefore juries, to focus on adequacy of data or testing, presence of
publications, and level of general acceptance in (i) judicial assessments
of reliability, (ii) determining appropriate subjects for deposition and
cross-examination questions, and (iii) drafting jury instructions.
Once acknowledged, the social aspects of scientific activity may
nevertheless be characterized, in idealized accounts of science, as
relatively insignificant or at least as unworthy of serious attention. First,
one may distinguish between internal and external factors in scientific
activity. Further, one may identify the internal factors as good, that is,
productive and positive, and the external factors as bad, or at least as
superfluous to genuine science.35 Indeed, peer review and publication, and
31. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phanns., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993).
32. Id.
33. Testability and low error rate are identified, without qualification, as features
of science, while peer review and publications, and general acceptance, are factors that
may not always be present. Id.
34. Id.
35. See SANDRA HARDING, Is SCIENCE MULTICULTURAL?: POSTCOLONIALISMS,
FEMINISMS, AND EPISTEMOLOGIES 2-3 (1998).
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general acceptance may be seen as internal to good science; other
internal factors might include institutional gatekeeping (including
training and professionalization), methodological preferences, experimental
conventions, instruments and measurement technologies, models to
represent nature, theoretical paradigms, scientific language, negotiation
techniques and strategies for conflict resolution and consensus-building,
cognitive capacity and perception, and even values like consistency,
honesty, rigor, self-criticism, and reproducibility. Each such factor is a
social, not natural, structure, but each may be conceived as conducive to
natural scientific inquiry.

A central assumption of [the conventional] theory of scientific knowledge is
that the success of modem science is insured by its internal featuresexperimental method or scientific method more generally, science's standards
for maximizing objectivity and rationality, the use of mathematics to express
nature's laws ....
Therefore, when sciences function at their very best, their institutions,
cultures, and practices ... should be understood to provide the necessary
conditions for sciences to do their work, but they should not influence the
results of research in any culturally distinctive way. Any and all social values
and interests that might initially get into the results of scientific research
should be firmly weeded out as soon as possible through subsequent critical
vigilance.
Id.
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External factors might include political interests and pressures,
including ethical and policy limitations, economic interests, funding
bias, fraud, bad or misleading instruments and models, greed, ambition,
rhetoric and persuasion, gender or racial bias, and general cultural
values. The problem with internal and external distinctions is that
external factors are not always bad or superfluous, and internal factors
are not always good or productive. Greed, ambition, persuasion, or
economic interests might produce the best science, while institutional
gatekeeping, theoretical paradigms, and models may at times lead
scientists astray.
Even if the internal and external distinction breaks down, social
factors may also be ignored through a distinction between context of
discovery and context of justification.36 The messier aspects of science,
for example greed or ambition, may be categorized as belonging to the
context of discovery, where new ideas might come from anywhere,37
even from sloppy techniques and cultural bias. The validity of science is
grounded in the context of justification, which is the idealized picture of
science: testability, methodology, reproducibility and probable conclusions.
This distinction, as well, is problematic, since social aspects pervade the
context of justification.38
36. See Fischer, supra note 19, at 63-64. "Scientists distinguish between
discovery (which may be serendipitous) and confirmation/falsification, between the
sociology of science and the content of science . . . . [Such] accounts ... ignore or
downplay the sociological and political environments that enable them." Id.
37. See Goodstein, supra note 24, at 70 ("Nobody can say where the theory comes
from."); see also Ian Hacking, How Inevitable Are the Results of Successful Science?, 67
PHIL. Ser. S58, S69 (2000).
[I]t is patently obvious that which questions get asked, taken seriously,
investigated, funded, reported, analyzed, and so forth is the result of social
processes, human interactions, and current interests. Very few detailed
questions are asked about the most widespread tropical diseases because there
is no money in it for drug companies ....
HACKING, supra, at 569.
38. See WERNER CALLEBAUT, TAKING THE NATURALISTIC TuRN, OR How REAL
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IS DONE 211-13 (1993) (transcribing conversations with
William Bechtel, Thomas Nickles, and other philosophers of science).
Bechtel: Examining the work of scientists ... I came to realize what proportion
of their time was devoted to social activities and how important those were
in terms of determining the intellectual content of their work. Such things
as which scientist would respond to which other and what experiment
someone would do were affected....
Even [conforming to a prescribed style in a scientific text] is an important
social constraint: you realize that scientists are writing in a particular way

277

Finally, another "defense mechanism" to critical discussion of social
factors is the explanation of errors by reference to social influences, and
the explanation of success by reference to nature. 39 For example,
funding bias and political pressure may be viewed as mistakes to
eliminate, leaving the impression that social influences can be avoided.
All of these characterizations of the social aspects of science-external
influences, internal supports, context of discovery, and avoidable
errors-function to downplay the inevitable institutional and rhetorical
character of scientific theory and practice.
Because the narrative above identifies at least twenty social aspects of
science in addition to the peer-reviewed publication process, another
diagram may be helpful to show how our picture of science can be
expanded beyond the previous core or idealized picture. Diagram II is
also a representation of how most of these social factors can be
explained away or rendered superfluous. The "external influences"
depicted above the idealized account of science include the "context of
discovery" (where greed or ambition, or anything-for example,

because that's the only style that's acceptable to get their ideas across.
They're fitting into a channel.... Also, I came to realize that there is a
dynamic that involves who else is in the community and that this influences
how one scientist uses words to establish something.
Callebaut: Back to justification. You [Nickles] make a daring claim ... that in
a sense all justification-and hence all rationality-is at bottom social.
Nickles: It sounds daring, but in a way it's trivial. At bottom what else is
there? Justification comes down to addressing human critics . . . . [I]t is
ultimately a matter of what the critical community lets you get away with.

The important philosophical implication is that justification as it really
operates in ongoing inquiry is quite local. The arguments and moves that
make a difference, that cause investigators to behave one way rather than
another, are typically quite local.
Id.; see also STEVEN SHAPIN, THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION 10 (1996) ("There is as much
'society' inside the scientist's laboratory, and internal to the development of scientific
knowledge, as there is 'outside."').
39. See JONATIIAN POITER, REPRESENTING REALITY: DISCOURSE, RHETORIC AND
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION I 9 (1996).
False belief could be directly explained through a "social fact" (personality,
prejudice and so on) disrupting the proper operation of scientific norms. True
belief ... arises directly from a careful investigation of how the world is. Put
simply, in this view of science, the facts themselves determine truth, while
error is explained by processes of a psychological or sociological nature. The
consequence of this is that with true belief there was nothing to explain save
for how the conditions for proper scientific inquiry came about and how those
conditions are undermined.
In effect ... the [sociology of error] tradition ... bracketed off the study
of facts themselves and contented itself with examining their sociological
context. A full sociological analysis of the content of science-of scientific
ideas, theories, methods and so on-was reserved only for falsehoods.
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religion-might accidentally lead to good, justifiable science). Other
examples of external influences include cultural or social influences, as
well as erroneous or junk science. All of these influences may be
viewed as eliminable, once identified, by setting a boundary between
them and the core activities. Indeed, the core, expressed earlier as the
idealized picture of science, becomes the "context of justification," the
arena wherein fraud can be caught, mistakes can be corrected, and
biased or interested science can be falsified. The "internal supports"the social aspects of science depicted below the core activities on the
diagram-are harder to get rid of, but may be dismissed as obvious (that
is, language and perception are givens) and in any event as necessary but
benign and unproblematic. If something does go wrong internally, such
as an insufficient model, a biased laboratory or an inaccurate
measurement device, then it becomes an external influence to be moved
to the top of the diagram and then eliminated by careful core activities.
In the remainder of this Article, I want to challenge the "dismissive"
arrangement of influences in Diagram II by suggesting that many of
these identifiable social aspects of science should remain in play in our
legal discourse concerning scientific expertise. This is not to say that
every social aspect identified is present or significant in every scientific
activity, but rather that many social factors are characteristic of science
generally, and therefore are as much a part of science as data or an
experimental test. After discussing how sociologists of science identify
and investigate the significance of the social aspects of science, I suggest
how lawyers and judges might do the same.
II.

ETHNOGRAPHY AND SCIENCE

[T]he fact that science is political and deeply embedded in [cultural] events
is not simply the now-cliched, albeit important conclusion of social scientists
and historians studying scientists, but is part of the condition of doing
science . . . . Some scientists ... acknowledge their social embeddedness not at
all or only in the most indirect and subtle ways; for others it is diversely and
strongly expressed.40

Ethnomethodology41 has become an established, if varied, mode of
40. George E. Marcus, Introduction, in TECHNOSCIENTIAC IMAGINARIES, supra
note 19, at 1, 7.
41. See MICHAEL MOERMAN, TALKING CULTURE: ETHNOGRAPHY AND
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS ix (1988) ("The term 'ethnometholodogy' ... is the proper
name for viewing 'the objective reality of social facts as an ongoing accomplishment of
the concerted activities of daily life,"' and for "discovering the formal properties of
common-place ... actions 'from within' actual settings, as ongoing accomplishments of
those settings." (quoting HAROLD GARANKEL, STUDIES IN ETHNOMETHODOLOGY vii-viii
(1967))).
Moerman distinguishes "conversation analysis"-the study of "the
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analysis in science studies. In anthropology, "ethnography usually
requires learning the language, developing key informants, and spending
at least one to two years of more-or-less continuous participantobservation in a community, organization, or social movement."42 The
method has been borrowed in other disciplines such as ethnomusicology
(wherein the local music of an ethnic community is studied), and in
comparative law, for example by Leopold Pospisil in The Ethnology of
Law,43 which focused on the legal system of the Kapauku Papuans of
West New Guinea. In science studies, however,
"ethnography" has historically applied loosely to any kind of fieldwork-based
method, including short-term observational studies. Thus, in science studies
circles the term has a considerably looser usage than in anthropology. . . . For
this reason, the term "laboratory studies" is preferable for the first wave of
ethnographic studies [which] addressed questions about theoretical issues in the
sociology and philosophy ofknowledge.44

Following scientists through society, or looking over their shoulders,
is a means to study the fact-making process, to view the "interactions
among scientific, governmental, industrial, religious, and other domains
of society," and to identify rituals, values, and material culture such as
buildings, machines, and equipment that characterize the scientific
enterprise.45 The anthropological model is justified by viewing science
as a subculture with its own language(s), conventions, institutional
hierarchies, values, and structures for training and professionalization of
its members. 46

organization of everyday talk''-from ethnography -"understanding ... how people
make sense of their lives," but says that conversation analysis is within the intellectual
tradition of ethnomethodology and must be coupled with ethnography. Id. at x.
42. DAVID J. HEss, SCIENCE STIJDIES: AN ADVANCED INTRODUCTION 134 (1997).
43. LEOPOLD J. POSPISIL, THE ETHNOLOGY OF LAW (2d ed. 1978).
44. HEss, supra note 42, at 134.
45. See id. at 135.
46. See BRUNO LATOUR, WEHAVENEVERBEENMODERN 101-02 (1993).
[The ethnologist] sets out to analyze one tribe . . . for example, scientific
researchers or engineers . . . . Her tribe of scientists claims that in the end they
are completely separating their knowledge of the world from the necessities of
politics and morality. In the observer's eyes, however, this separation is never
very visible . . . . Her informers claim that they have access to Nature, but the
ethnographer sees perfectly well that they have access only to a vision, a
representation of Nature that she herself cannot distinguish neatly from politics
and social interests.
Id. (citations omitted).
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Reasons for engaging in ethnographic research, which usually
involves interviewing scientists as "informants" and analyzing the
transcripts, vary in science studies.47 Some want to discern the values at
work in science, particularly to reveal unattractive values or to suggest
social values to which scientists should be committed.48 Others want to
degrade scientific knowledge, to demonstrate that science is just another
cultural activity with no more claim to truth than political theory or
religion. 49 My own sense is that ethnographic research is useful in the
effort to define science or describe how it really works. 50 Whatever the
purpose, the ethnography of science is a growing subdiscipline of
science studies that is no longer haphazard or undertheorized. Examples
of ethnographic research are published,5 1 and materials are available that
identify interviewing skills and common blunders,52 as well as the
importance of indexicality ("the meaning of a word or utterance is
dependent on its context of use"), reflexivity ("descriptions are not just
about something but they are also doing something"), and the
documentary method of interpretation (people understand "events and
actions ... in terms of background expectancies, models, and ideas") in
conversation analysis. 53 Because of my concern that idealized accounts
47. See generally Marcus, supra note 40, and the ethnographic conversations and
commentaries collected in TECHNOSCIENTIFIC IMAGINARIES, supra note 19.
48. See, e.g., Langdon Winner, Social Constructivism: Opening the Black Box and
Finding It Empty, 16 SCI. AS CULTURE 427, 443-49 (1993) (arguing that social studies of
science and technology should not be neutral reports but morally and politically
evaluative).
49. Jonathan Potter, for example, describes the social constructivist "argument ...
that there is nothing epistemologically special about scientific work. Scientific
knowledge production does not have principled differences from knowledge in legal or
everyday settings." POTIER, supra note 39, at 35. Ethnomethodology or conversation
analysis offers critics of science a tool for studying "the methods people use for
producing and understanding factual descriptions." Id. at 42.
50. See Marcus, supra note 40, at 7.
[B]eginning to ask how scientists have faith in their own activity, or in what
ways their perceptions of what they are doing are changing, given some form
of distinctive consciousness about the social and cultural construction of their
activity, generates a completely transformed and vast field of inquiry on which
a distinctly cultural studies of science might establish itself. The reflexivity
brings a range of new factors explicitly into the production of science, and in
this sense, makes it more directly cultural, or blended with concerns that were
thought to be external to scientific activity.
51. See sources cited supra note 47.
52. See, e.g., CHARLES L. BRIGGS, LEARNING How TO ASK: A SOCIOLINGUISTIC
APPRAISAL OF THE ROLE OF THE INTERVIEW IN SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH (1986).
53. See POTIER, supra note 39, at 43, 47, 49. A useful example of indexicality and
problems of interpretation appears in Michael Moerman & Harvey Sacks, On
"Understanding" in the Analysis of Natural Conversation, in MOERMAN, supra note 41,
at app. B.
Roger says: "Ken face it, you're a poor little rich kid." Ken then says: "Yes,
Mommy. Thank you." Roger then says: "Face the music." We are sure that
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of science in law tend toward "stereotypical images of scientists as cut
off from society and culture, concerned only with the micro-worlds of
labs and their professional networks,"54 and because of the suggestion in
science studies that "the insight concerning the social constructedness
and embeddedness of scientific activity ... is also shared to varying degrees
by scientists and scientific institutions themselves,"55 I decided to
interview three neuroscientists concerning their laboratory research. My
goal was to explore, in conversation, aspects of scientific activity that
are not captured in idealizations of science. I chose neuroscientists as
informants both because their field is dynamic and revolutionary within
the disciplines of psychiatry and psychology56 and because neuroscientists
often collapse social existence into the natural, hence the term "eliminative
materialism."57 My informants included "X," a very successful middleaged professor, who is a recipient of numerous grants, is engaged in
commercial consulting, and is the author of numerous publications and
you, like those present, [understood] ..• Ken's "Mommy" as a deliberate and
consequential misidentification of Roger, and not as an error, or as a correct
identification of someone not present-Ken's mother.
MOERMAN, supra note 41, at 185.
54. See Marcus, supra note 40, at 7.
55. See id.
56. See Joseph Durnil, Twenty-First-Century PET: Looking for Mind and Morality
Through the Eye of Technology, in TECHNOSCIENTIF1C IMAGINARIES, supra note 19, at 87
(ethnographic analysis of scientists working in PET (positron emission tomography)).
Dur.UT: Nancy Andreasen, she has written about the biological revolution
in psychiatry. You were in medical school during this time. Did you also get
the other side of psychiatry?
[JOSEPH] Wu: Oh, very much so. I would say that most of the
psychiatrists in this [U.C.-Irvine] department are still analytically, dynamically
focused. I would say that biologically oriented psychiatrists still make up a
minority of the faculty, maybe thirty to forty percent.
Id. at 114-16.
51. See id. at 112-13.
DUMIT: This [Washington University] is one of the centers of biological
psychology.
[MICHEL] TER-POGOSSIAN: Yes, indeed, there are few followers of
Freud . . . . But I don't know what the human mind is. Don't misunderstand
me, I'm not being difficult about that. But it is probably related to the brain. If
you remove the brain, there is not much mind left.
Dur.m: Right. I haven't met anybody involved with PET who is not at
least that, the eliminative materialist, as it's called.
TER-POGOSSIAN: Is that what it is?
DUMIT: Without the brain, you are nothing. At least that much is
material.
TER-POGOSSIAN: Beyond that, it really starts getting difficult.
Id.
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conference papers; "Y," a retiring professor at the end of a successful
career; and "Z," a relatively young but highly credentialed professor.
Even though I asked similar questions of each informant concerning
educational background, current research, whether science is ever
neutral, and new ideas in psychology, the particular socio-cultural
aspects of science discussed by each varied somewhat. I should
emphasize that my informants did not believe that they were engaged
professionally in an enterprise that is primarily rhetorical, philosophical,
or driven by social structures. Obviously, they saw their work as
grounded in natural phenomena. Each therefore reacted against, in
different ways, any suggestion that science is only a cultural discourse or
belief system. Informant X was not enamored with the idea that the
objects of science are quasi-objects or socio-natural hybrids, and he was
dismissive of philosophy of science in general. 58 Informants Y and Z
viewed the social aspects of science as influences, which can be bad if
research is restricted but good if they constitute useful structures in
which scientists can work. 59
58. See Interview with X, Professor of Psychology, Neuroscience Program 7-8
(Mar. 7, 2001) (unpublished transcript on file with author).
[CAUDILL]: [A] lot of ethnographic scholars in science studies are saying that
what they're finding is a breakdown in any sort of Cartesian separation
between subject and object. ... Also, your comments about every time you're
dealing with an object in the lab, the brain activity regarding smell, that's not
different from a person deciding to sit in a different place in the bus [in which
an odor was placed in one seat]; ... was that a social activity, not sitting [in a
particular seat] on the bus, or was that a natural object ... in the brain? The
answer is it's both and neither, it is a quasi-object, it's something between the
two ....

[X]: I just cannot believe that.... I find that I'm reminded, my old advisor
who said that he really liked philosophy until he reached adolescence and then
he went on to other pursuits. I can't believe that is a viable argument and it
seems to me specious. . . . What other world is there besides the natural
world?
Id.

59. See Interview with Y, Professor of Psychology, Neuroscience Program 15-16
(Mar. 20, 2001) (unpublished transcript on file with author).
[CAUDILL]: [S]ome scholars say that science is never neutral, it's not an
activity that takes place in isolation, but there's always particular institutional
settings, that there's always value choices as to what's important, there's
always commitments as to what you're looking for because your discipline has
a history and it's pulling for certain things ....

[Y]: You know it seems like to a certain extent you almost have to have that
kind of structure . . . . But the problem is of course if you have too much
structure you really scare people off or else you really kind of prevent them
developing the potential that they have.
Id.; see also Interview with Z, Assistant Professor of Psychology, Neuroscience Program
12-14 (Mar. 30, 2001) (unpublished transcript on file with author).
[CAUDILL]: [S]cience studies scholars suggest that science is never neutral, it
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Nevertheless, in our conversations it was clear that the social aspects
of scientific activity are integral to the enterprise. Because I was
interested in identifying social aspects of science, I began with a
catalogue-a list or menu derived from scholarly literature in science
studies-of potential social "factors." In my interviews, I chose not to
inquire about those social factors which most scientists consider
anomalous or eliminable, including greed, ambition, fraud, obvious
funding bias or corporate agendas, bad measuring instruments, and
mistakes or identifiable human error. I also did not focus on cultural
variations in scientific research, or public understanding of and influence
upon science, each of which has been the subject of critical studies of
science.6 Finally, I wanted to distinguish between aspects of science
that are, for all practical purposes, inevitable, and those that can be
conceived of as problematic or controversial, such as the cultural
construction of science in terms of class, race and ethnicity, or gender and
sexuality.61 Focusing on the former, I was left with the following catalogue:

°

always involves particular institutional settings with their own language and
standards of persuasion, it's always got value choices as to what's
important ....
[Z]: Well, I think it's a double-edged sword .... [Y]es, science is not neutral....
[T]here's nobody handing out lots of money to just let us go free in the
laboratory. . . . I know that that was practically the environment ... in the late
60's to the early 70's .... I think that was extremely good for science. And I
think it was bad because it created this public perception . . . . [W]hy was the
taxpayer paying for that? ...
On the other hand, I think that it really causes scientists to think long and hard
about what it is they plan to do.
60. Regarding cultural variations, see SHARON TRAWEEK, BEAMTIMES AND LIFETIMFS:
THE WORLD OF HIGH ENERGY PHYSICISIS 126-64 (1988) (comparing Japanese and Western
physicists, and exploring the roles of national and gender cultures in shaping scientific
institutions and practices); see also HEss, supra note 42, at 134-35. "Sharon Traweek's
ethnographic studies of physicists, based on over a decade of ethnographic fieldwork, are
often regarded as a landmark for the beginning of the second wave of ethnography [(the
first wave was produced by Europeans trained in sociology and philosophy))." Id. at
135. Regarding public influence on science, see STEVEN EPSTEIN, IMPURE SCIENCE:
AIDS, ACTIVISM, AND THE PoLmcs OF KNOWLEDGE 26-41 (1996) (demonstrating the
impact of AIDS activists on medical research and funding).
61. See generally DAVID J. HEss, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMULTICULTURAL
WORLD: THE CULTURAL PoLmcs OF FACTS AND ARTIFACTS (1995); see also HARDING,
supra note 35, at 2-3.
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(1) Cognitive capacity and limitations, including perception62
(2) Standards as to what is interesting or what is worth doing, 63
including
(a) the effects of funding and patronage
(b) general cultural values (for example, honesty)
(c) specific ethical conceptions of, for example, unacceptable
research
(d) government policy and political interests (which overlap
with (a), (b), and (c) above)
(3) Language, 64 including
62. See RONALD N. GIERE, SCIENCE WITHOUT LAWS 48-53 (1999) (discussing "the
biological and psychological mechanisms underlying the cognitive capacities of
individual scientists," id. at 49, and the need to look to cognitive science to explore those
mechanisms); see also Nancy J. Nersessian, Opening the Black Box: Cognitive Science
and the History of Science, IO OSIRIS 194-211 (1995) (discussing cognitive history of
science, cognitive science, and the investigation of creativity, conceptual innovations,
technological innovations, communicative practices, and the role of training in science).
63. See Kitcher, supra note 16, at 36 ("The social structures in which science is
embedded affect the kinds of questions that are taken to be most significant and,
sometimes, the answers that are proposed and accepted.").
[T]he kinds of problems singled out as important depend in part on the history
of the field and on the wider interests of members of society. . . . [S]ome
problems are especially significant ... partly because of the history of research
[in the field], partly because of what it is ... possible to do, and partly because
of the practical consequences of certain forms of inquiry when applied to the
problems of certain kinds of societies.
Id. at 37; see also Pierre Bourdieu, The Specificity of the Scientific Field and the Social
Conditions of the Progress of Reason, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER 31 (Mario
Biagioli ed., 1999).
[I]t is pointless to distinguish between strictly scientific determinations and
strictly social determinations of practices that are essentially overdetennined. ...
Fred Reif shows ... how artificial and indeed impossible it is to distinguish
between intrinsic and extrinsic interest ... "A scientist strives to do research
which he considers important. But intrinsic satisfaction and interest are not
his only reasons . ... The scientist wants his work to be not only interesting to
himself but also important to others." What is regarded as important and
interesting is what is likely to be recognized by others as important and
interesting ....
Id. at 32-33 (quoting Fred Reif, The Competitive World of the Pure Scientist, 134
SCIENCE 1957-62 (1961)).
"The sciences depend upon their 'context' not only for funding and material resources;
recruits and auxiliary personnel; institutional location in universities, academies, corporations,
bureaucracies, or foundations; social norms, cultural forms, and bodily disciplines; but
also for much of what is ultimately at issue or at stake in scientific practices." Joseph
Rouse, Understanding Scientific Practices: Cultural Studies of Science as a
Philosophical Program, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER, supra, at 442, 445.
64. See Timothy Lenoir, Inscription Practices and Materialities of
Communication, in INSCRIBING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC TEXTS AND THE MATERIALITY OF
COMMUNICATION 1, 1-19 (Timothy Lenoir ed., 1998).
Considerations about language, whether Kuhn-inspired in quantitative linkages
between scientific publications or concerns about Wittgensteinian language
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(a) scientific and discursive regimes
(b) governing metaphors
(c) conventions of rhetoric and persuasion
(4) Evolution and constraints of measurement instruments and
technology65
(5) Observation variables,66 including
(a) dominant theoretical paradigms
(b) models and maps that function as representations of nature
(c) expectations, including their effect on interpretation of data
(6) Institutional gatekeeping, including
(a) training
(b) professionalization

games and fonns of life, have always been part of science studies in one form
or another....
. . . [S]cholars from the side ofliterature studies have begun to focus on the
role of rhetorical practice and techniques of persuasion in scientific texts, on
narrative structures and metaphor in the internal structure of scientific work,
and on the semiosis among scientific narratives and grand cultural narratives,
represented in literature, museum exhibits, and popular culture, as means for
the construction and stabilization of scientific artifacts.
Id. at 1, 3; see also JOSEPH ROUSE, ENGAGING SCIENCE: How TO UNDERSTAND ITS PRACTICES
PHILOSOPIDCAILY 158-65 (1996) (discussing the tum to narrative in science studies).
65. See DAVID HEss, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN A MULTICULTURAL WORLD:
THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF FACTS AND ARTIFACTS 3 (1995) ("Even apparently
transparent observations, such as machine inscriptions of data, are social because
machine design is the product of a history that involves social negotiation, as are
decisions over calibration and how to interpret machine inscriptions.").
66. Id.
What people expect to observe, are able to observe, and want to observe are all
shaped in part by their theories and assumptions, which in tum are outcomes of
discussions and controversies in which social negotiation is critical....
(However, ... this claim does not mean that observations have nothing to do
with reality: observations are simultaneously socially shaped and
representative of a "real" material or social world.)
Id.; see also Donna J. Haraway, Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in
Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective, in THE SCIENCE STUDIES READER,
supra note 63, at 172, 177.
[A]II eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual systems,
building in translations and specific ways of seeing . . . . There is no
unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura in scientific accounts of
bodies and machines; there are only highly specific visual possibilities, each
with a wonderfully detailed, active, partial way of organizing worlds.
Haraway, supra at 177.
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(c) symbolic capital67 (social networks, Rolodex, positions
held, previous accomplishments, etc., that lend credibility)
(d) consensus-building and negotiation techniques
(7) Methodological variation and experimental conventions 68
The above catalogue, intended to capture ordinary social aspects of
science as opposed to eliminable problems or negative influences,
offers both a complex picture of science to supplement idealizations,
which emphasize core aspects, and a categorization scheme for
classifying statements made by scientists in my interviews. I did not
classify references to core aspects of science, which were numerous,
because I take it to be obvious that science involves theories, data
collection, and conclusions that promise some level of objectivity,
precision, and prediction. Again, my informants did not address each
social category in our conversations; I began each interview with
general questions about the informant's background and current
research interests, and when I later asked about social aspects of their
work I was intentionally ambiguous. In the following summaries of
each interview, therefore, variable responses were to be expected. 69

67. See HESS, supra note 42, at 118.
Some researchers have found Bourdieu's [concept] of symbolic capital ... to
be particularly useful. One might think of symbolic capital as status viewed
through a political economy lens. Symbolic capital can be saved and spent,
hoarded and wasted, accumulated and invested, and transformed into financial
capital. In terms of science, symbolic capital might be operationalized as a
scientist's CV and rolodex, that is, a set of career achievements and a
network . . . similar to the concepts of reputation and recognition in the
sociology of science.
Id.; see also Bourdieu, supra note 63, at 33.
The struggle for scientific authority, a particular kind of social capital which
gives power over the constitutive mechanisms of the field . . . owes its
specificity to the fact that the producers tend to have no possible clients other
than their competitors . . . . This means that in a highly autonomous scientific
field, a particular producer cannot expect recognition of the value of his
products ("reputation," "prestige," "authority," "competence," etc.) from
anyone except other producers who, being his competitors too, are those least
inclined to grant recognition without discussion and scrutiny.
Bourdieu, supra note 63, at 33.
68. See HESS, supra note 61, at 3.
Decisions on appropriate methods, criteria for establishing replication,
statistical measures, quantitative versus qualitative measurement, and so on are
shaped by rhetoric, network politics, disciplinary cultures, personal
reputations, gender socialization patterns, and so on. There is no single
Scientific Method to which all scientists can refer; instead, laboratory
procedures are opportunistic and contingent on social factors.
Id.
69. Interview with X, supra note 58; Interview with Y, supra note 59; Interview
with Z, supra note 59.
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INTERVIEW WITH X:

(1)

(2)

(3)

Cognitive Capacity and Limitations: "I also recognize the fact
that my experience is different from many other humans . . . .
Males tend to not think about odors in the same way as
females."
Standards as to What Is Interesing and Important
(a) Funding: "[I]t's important to have an income. In order to
have an income you have to stay sort of within the
mainstream of science."
Language:
[Our] language is going to change how you think about [mind and body],
and this happens in the law when it comes to the insanity defense; our
ideas about human behavior are so inherently dualistic . . . I think
changing the way people talk about this and reducing this dualistic
language in terms of the descriptions of this physical world will actually
be ... useful. . . .

(4)

Instruments:
It would be absurd to imagine that you didn't have constraints on the
outcome you were expecting. By simply choosing a measurement
instrument, a device to measure, you are generating hypotheses [that
constrain] what's going to happen. We all know that you can measure one
thing and have multiple things happening and then ignore those others.

(5)

Observation:
I think one of the more interesting things in science are those people who
are at the edge . . . and how they are either embraced or pushed out of
regular scientific journals. . . . [Y]ou have a lot of expectations out
there. . . . There are an infinite number of solutions so I have to constrain
my solutions.

(6)

(1)

Institutional Gatekeeping: "[W]hen I asked my advisor if we
couldn't do some smell experiments in the lab he said, no, we
can't, it's just too difficult to control odors and stimulate and so
we're not doing that."
Methodological Variation:
[W]e lost evolutionary psychology. . . . It's actually impossible
methodologically to compare a goldfish with a dog and people said of
course and so it was dropped .... [T]hen suddenly in literally the last 5
years, you have had this re-emergence of people who want to say things
about the comparative nature of animals . . . . I think that ... we're recouching these things, they come and go as fashions, and that's
troubling ....
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INTERVIEW WITHY:

(1)
(2)

Cognitive Capacity and Limitations: [no significant remarks]
Standards as to What Is Interesting and Important
(a) Funding:
[T]here were pharmaceutical firms that were very interested
especially in following this .... [T]hen [the researchers in England
with whom Y was working] approached a couple of big firms that
are, I guess a number of pharmaceutical companies get together and
they have a granting agency that ... support[s] this kind of research
. . . . [T]he idea was there would [be] money to last for three years.
Well, the money didn't go that far .... So they raised [money by
going public].

Ethical Policy Constraints: "[O]ur new administration
put[s] such constraints on using fetal tissue for research ....
That's an ethical issue that is so important . . . . [S]ocial
values are getting in the way of scientific progress . . . in
the [United] [S]tates ...."
Language: [Y agreed that there's an aspect of persuasiveness in
science, convincing others that one's work is valuable to get
funding.]
Instruments: [no significant remarks]
Observation
(b) Models:
(C)

(3)
(4)
(5)

You can create a stroke in rats by cutting off the carotid arteries and
having them on a respirator for about ten minutes, but they lose
about 60% of the animals, but they have the same kind of damage
you have with a person who's had a heart attack... . So they
[think] if [they] could directly damage those cells and not lose so
many animals ... that would be a good kind of animal model ....

(6)

(7)

Institutional Gatekeeping: "So we did one study that for the
longest [time just] sat there and nobody paid any attention to it,
and just within about the last two or three years, people really
started paying attention."
Methodological Variation: [no significant remarks]

INTERVIEW WITH Z:

(1)

(2)

Cognitive Capacity and Limitations: "I think it's not really
practical or even advisable for a single person to try to cover all
the bases [in every discipline]."
Standards as to What is Interesting and Important
(a) Funding:
I think a lot of us whenever we make a pitch to the NIH ... have to
indicate that there is some benefit [that] there is social good coming
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out of what we do. . . . [W]hen you have a constituency to which
you're accountable, you've got to show some meaningful progress
.... And that is, I think, [an] apparent restriction of thought.

(3)

La,nguage:
[O]ne of the first things that I tell students in a class [is that] because of
the nature of the material, ... they're going to have to learn a lot of
vocabulary.... [I]t's like learning words in the dictionary [to enhance]
the ability to be conversant and to communicate in a succinct and accurate
way ....

(4)
(5)

Instruments: [no significant remarks]
Observation
(a) Paradigms:
[T]here's a considerable amount of friction between [those] doing
biological psychology, and people at other areas of the
[psychology] department. Now the biological psychologists are in
literally separated space . . . . [T]hose are people who have ... and
I'll admit that I'm sort of one of them ... only a very peripheral
interest in the overt behavior of the organisms that they study.

(6)

(1)

Institutional Gatekeeping: Funding requests are forwarded "to a
group of peers who are expert, to evaluate your work for several
different things. One is scientific novelty. Another one is rigor
of the proposal-feasibility. . . .
And they take into
consideration things like your track record; your biographical
sketch is an essential component."
Methodological Variation: [no significant remarks]

The value of ethnography, or conversation analysis, is its
informality-part anthropological interview with a key informant and
part journalistic profile. The setting allows for unanticipated turns and
linkages in a way that questionnaires sent to scientists might not.70
Scientists' own accounts of their work are not likely to emphasize the
institutional and rhetorical aspects of their work, except in the case of
70. See Roger Smith & Brian Wynne, Introduction, in EXPERT EVIDENCE:
INTERPRETING SCIENCE IN THE LAW 1 (Roger Smith & Brian Wynne eds., 1989)
[hereinafter EXPERT EVIDENCE].
We all benefited from extensive discussions with practitioners in the sciencelaw area. Many of these discussions took the form of a relatively unstructured
interview . . . . From the viewpoint of the empirical social sciences, our
method is too informal to count as 'method'; but, given a deliberate orientation
towards qualitative issues, it has served its purpose.
Id. at 11.
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autobiographies. Nevertheless, ethnography is obviously a supplement
to, and not a replacement of, the sociology of science generally (which
establishes the theory that science is a social activity), the philosophy of
science, and the history of science, each of which includes critical
scholars who offer insights as to how science really works in contrast to
popular or idealized accounts of scientific progress, including idealized
accounts within their own discipline.
In the next section, I tum to the practical literature regarding the use of
expert witnesses in trials, to show that the idealized version of scientific
activity pervades that discourse among lawyers. My ultimate argument
is that a discourse about science as a social enterprise would offer
insights for lawyers to use in depositions, in Daubert-type hearings,
during cross-examination, and in drafting jury instructions.
III. SCIENTIFIC EXPERTISE AND THE SOCIAL ASPECTS OF SCIENCE

"Of course social factors influence the course of science. The
only controversy concerns which social factors are operative in
which situations and how powerful these social factors tum out
to be."71
Expert scientific testimony is presented at trial in the context of a
dispute. While the legal dispute is broader than and distinguishable from
the scientific dispute, the disagreement between scientific experts
becomes a matter for resolution by the judge or jury. Jeremy Green
identifies three models of scientific disputes-contextual, ethnosociological,
and epistemological explanations-that emphasize "different aspects of
the scientific process.',n Contextual explanations "might refer to
differences in disciplinary perspectives, institutional or occupational
affiliations, methodological and metaphysical commitments, or social
interests."73 In his study of English workers' compensation cases, Green
found contextual explanations "comparatively rare."74 Ethnosociological
explanations, which might "refer to factors extraneous to the scientific
content of the dispute-for example, to the competence, neutrality and
openness, or the honesty of the participants" were slightly more
common. 75

71.
12.

Hull, supra note 15, at 74.
See Jeremy Green, Industrial Ill Health, Expertise, and the Law, in
EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 93, 119.
13. Id. at 119.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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Most common of all were epistemological explanations; expert witnesses and
barristers (the latter overwhelmingly so) preferred to explain disputes as caused
by the absence of sufficient facts or by 'grey areas.' Disagreement was seen as
a result of differences in interpretation, not differences as to what were the facts .
. . . [S]ociologial critiques of expertise were regularly translated ... into personal
accusations of bias .... Both the preferred explanation-shortage of facts and
legitimate differences in interpretation, and the rejected one-bias, are cast in
individualistic terms. The contextual dimension, and accounts of commitments
that do not entail personal bias, are excluded.76

The same tendency to exclude contextual explanations is evident in
the discourse concerning scientific expertise among U.S. lawyers. For
example, in Impeachment of Witnesses: The Cross-Examiner's Art, the
chapter on impeaching expert witnesses emphasizes pretrial discovery,
especially depositions, of adverse expert witnesses, as well as identifying
publications and transcripts of previous testimony, as important to
preparation.77 In addition to questioning the qualifications of an expert
and the consistency of the opinion with authoritative treatises,78 impeachment
can be based on "interest, bias, and motivation," that is, by showing that the
expert is not "a disinterested professional."79 While payment for
testimony alone is not determinative, the fact that an expert derives a
substantial portion of her income from testifying, that the expert always
testifies for the same "side," that the expert opinion was prepared for
trial and was not basetl on information and knowledge acquired as part
of the expert's regular activities, or that professional conflict and
jealousy may be present, can each provide a basis for impeachment. 80
By reference to Green's models of scientific disputes,81 the authors of
Impeachment of Witnesses seem to view scientific disputes as
epistemological (involving shortage of facts, differences in interpretation)82
and ethnosociological (involving competence, neutrality),83 and they
Id. at 120.
See ROBERTO ARON ET AL., IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES: THE CROSSEXAMINER'S ART 140-47 (1990).
78. Id. at 147-51, 160-65.
19. Id. at 151.
80. Id. at 151-55.
81. See supra text accompanying note 71.
82. See ARON ET AL., supra note 77, at 158 (providing an example of a doctor who
did not personally observe the deceased but relied on observations of a forensic
pathologist without a lot of experience); id. at 154 (providing an example of a doctor
with a new theory that is subject to substantial academic and scientific criticism).
83. See id. at 147-51 (discussing how to question qualifications); id. at 151-55
(discussing how to establish interest, bias, and motivation to show that the expert is not a
"disinterested professional").
76.
77.
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tend to cast bias, interest and motivation in individualistic terms.
Contextual explanations are thereby eclipsed, and the fields of "disciplinary
perspectives, institutional or occupational affiliations, methodological
and metaphysical commitments, or social interests" are not mentioned as
rich sources for impeachment materials, except as to personal qualifications
and accusations of individual bias. 84
In Malone and Zwier's Effective Expert Testimony, discussing crossexamination on financial or other bias, the same individualistic emphasis
is apparent; financial or other bias are matters for impeachment. 85 Later
in their treatise, the authors distinguish impeachment from "substantive"
cross-examination, 86 and the treatise concludes with a chapter on
examining reliability using the four Daubert factors (testability, error
rate, publication, and general acceptance) and others (for example,
science prepared for litigation, adequacy to explain important empirical
data, basis in sufficient data, consistency, credentials, and derivation
from mainstream approaches). 87 That is, when the authors consider
more contextual matters involving the scientific community and not
personal bias, the framework for examination reflects an idealized view
of science nearly bereft of, in Green's formulation, the field of "disciplinary
perspectives, institutional or occupational affiliations, methodological
and metaphysical commitments, or social interests." 88 Indeed, earlier in
their treatise, Malone and Zwier caution against "macro" lines of crossexamination that go "after the whole discipline": The "place to challenge
an entire field is in limine, in a Daubert-type challenge." 89 Malone and
Zwier have also developed a useful set of rules for deposing expert
witnesses, including a recommendation that counsel ask what the expert
relied on or decided not to rely on, who in the expert's field agrees or
disagrees with the expert, and who did the collection of data (for
84. Green, supra note 72, at 119. Roberto Aron et al. discuss cross-examining a
witness who holds a novel theory that is out of step with mainstream science, but only to
raise professional conflict and jealousy as a persuasive basis for impeachment. ARON ET
AL., supra note 77, at 154. They also discuss lack of professional affiliations as a basis
for questioning qualifications. See id. at 18-21.
85. DAVID M. MALONE & PAUL J. ZWIER, EFFECTIVE EXPERT TEsTIMONY 164
(2000).
86. Id. at 187. Substantive cross-examination, in contrast to impeaching inquires,
involves factual issues in the case-why a bracket failed or whether tests were
conducted.
87. See id. at 223-33.
88. Green, supra note 72, at 119. In fairness, the reliability inquiry could
potentially lead to evidence regarding disciplinary perspectives (for example, explaining
why a novel theory has not been published), but institutional affiliations, methodological
commitments, or social interests (for example, funding for certain kinds of research but
not others, due to corporate, government, or public influence) do not appear in legal
discourse as factors relevant to reliability.
89. MALONE & ZWIER, supra note 85, at 193.

294

[VOL.

39: 269, 2002]

Idealized Accounts of Science
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

example, assistants), 90 each of which could lead to a more contextual
approach, but tend not to because of the pervasive emphasis on a
particular, individual expert and not the community or discipline. 91
Professor Edward Imwinkelried' s The Methods of Attacking Scientific
Evidence identifies the potential of bias (i) in favor of a particular
instrument or technique in which an expert has a financial interest,92 (ii)
originating in prior knowledge and opinions,93 (iii) due to prior
occupation (for example, law enforcement),94 (iv) in favor of a particular
party or type of party (for example, large corporations, or injured
plaintiffs),95 (v) related to indirect financial interests (for example,
affiliation with an organization or university that "receive[s] grants
from a party to the lawsuit or from the same industry"), 96 or (vi) in
favor of a particular theory or technique, which Imwinkelried calls
"doctrinal bias."97 While lmwinkelried frames these types of bias in the
individualistic terms typical of legal discourse concerning impeachment,
the contours of a contextual or communal notion of bias begin to emerge.
Green's field of "disciplinary perspectives, institutional or occupational
affiliations, methodological and metaphysical commitments, or social
interests"98 need not be translated, as usual, 99 into personal accusations
of bias-lmwinkelreid even refers to prior knowledge, opinion, and
occupations as "innocent" or "subconscious" bias that lacks the bad faith
associated with crass financial interests. 100 Instead of characterizing bias
as the opposite of good science, disciplinary, institutional, occupational,
or methodological bias can be seen as part of science. As to the former

90. See DAVID M. MALoNE & PAUL J. ZWIER, EXPERT RULES: 100 (AND MORE)
POINTS You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT EXPERT WITNESSES 49-53 (2d ed. 2001).
91. Again, in fairness, the question: "Who in this field agrees with your
methodology?," id. at 52, seems to implicate a discipline or scientific community, but the
only point is that a particular expert may be an "outlier," id., in conflict with other
experts. The idea that scientific communities-their language, values, consensusbuilding techniques, and institutions-represent a force, alongside nature in the
production of knowledge, is not suggested.
92. EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE METHODS OF ATTACKING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
118 (3d ed. 1997).
93. Id. at 250.
94. Id. at 252.
95. Id. at 255.
96. Id. at 256.
97. Id. at 257.
98. See Green, supra note 72, at 119.
99. See supra text accompanying note 76.
100. IMWINKELRIED, supra note 92, at 252.
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characterization-bias is bad---consider F. Lee Bailey and Henry B.
Rothblatt's Cross-Examination in Criminal Trials: "The good forensic
pathologist is detached and objective. However, you will encounter
some pathologists who will not be quite so professional. ... You must
be aware at the signs indicating that a medical examiner is
biased ...." 101
Contrast that warning with Dr. Bernard Diamond's view that "all
witnesses, regardless of who engaged them, identify closely with their
own opinions and unintentionally introduce as a result a certain degree
of bias and deviation from their oath to tell the truth .... " 102 Experts are
"bound to be biased and partial and strongly motivated toward advocacy
of [a] particular prejudiced point of view." 103 Inevitable bias in science
is more readily acknowledged among social scientists as "human beings
with social identities, beliefs, and values that link them to some causes
and parties more than to others." 104 However, the notions that social
science "depends upon, benefits from, and is interdependent with
extrascientific institutions," and that "financial allocations have overt or
covert strings attached [that] shape what gets studied [and] perhaps what
is concluded," 105 are arguably applicable to the hard sciences. For
example,
it is not possible to pursue either a programme of research or a career in
[complex areas of medicine] in isolation from a limited set of key institutions;
and the high financial costs of maintaining these institutions have led
researchers towards an increasingly close relationship with those industries that
have a direct interest in the extent and content of knowledge about particular
kinds of ill health. 106

Nevertheless, such "social" analyses of expertise seem rare in the
treatises on cross-examination of expert witnesses.
Roger Smith and Brian Wynne have attempted to explain the lack of
attention to contextual--disciplinary, institutional, occupational, and
methodological-models of scientific disputes in law. 107 They identify a
persistent "hope that the objectivity of science will provide a firm and
authoritative input, giving decisions a factual basis that cannot be
questioned. That the science often appears equivocal is put down to
101. F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATI, CROSS-EXAMINATION IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS241 (1978).
102. Bernard L. Diamond, The Fallacy of the Impartial Expert, in READINGS IN LAW
AND PSYCHIATRY 217, 218-19 (Richard C. Allen et al. eds., 1975).
103. Id. at 221.
104. See MARK A. CHESLER ET AL., SOCIAL SCIENCE IN COURT: MOBILIZING
EXPERTS IN THE SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CASES 63 (1988).
105. See id. at 63-64.
106. Green, supra note 72, at 126.
107. See generally Smith & Wynne, supra note 70.
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procedural problems rather than inherent properties of scientific
knowledge or methods ...." 108
Legal institutions function under pressures, "under constraints of time
and finite resources," that narrow the agenda in challenges of expertise. 109
Conditions of pressure therefore have the consequence that legal or expert
practitioners tend to perceive and think about the science-law relation at the
level of detail . . . . There may be difficulties of interpretation, agreement,
efficiency, and such like, at this level, but ... [t]o accept that there may be more
basic or general problems would be to accept potential problems in the
construction of authority by the institutions of science and law themselves ....
It is therefore hardly surprising that what literature there is on scientific
expertise in the law is mostly concerned with detailed and specific matters about
knowledge or procedure .... 11 0

Insights from the sociology of scientific knowledge, for example, "that
even the most disciplined and objective observation is never free of
theoretical and thus interpretive precommitmenfs," 111 or that a "proven
fact is ultimately a social achievement among scientists," 112 do not pass
easily into law as general propositions. The laws of evidence have
already constituted "certain kinds of knowledge as expert," 113 and even
though particular scientists are fair game for challenge, the "metaphysics
of law is that ... 'science' is reliable." 114 On the other hand, "legal
procedures often actually generate sceptical pressures on scientific
expertise. Indeed, such procedures sometimes show that 'established
scientific fact' is riddled with suppositions, unstated limiting conditions,
and other qualifications or uncertainties." 115 That is, lawyers regularly
"deconstruct" scientific claims 116-the "formal legal process can be
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id. at 3.
110. Id. at4-5.
111. See Brian Wynne, Establishing the Rules of Laws: Constructing Expert
Authority, in EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 70, at 23, 23.
112. Id. at 28.
113. See id. at 32.
114. See id. at 54.
115. Id. at 32.
116. Id.
[Legal] procedures sometimes show that 'established scientific fact' is riddled
with suppositions, unstated limiting conditions, and other qualifications or
uncertainties.
For instance, if one side in a case advances an expert claim stripped of
those nuances, the other side, if competent, may then proceed to reintroduce
them .... This 'deconstructs' the other side's scientific claim, showing it to
be made up of empirically unwarranted 'collective opinion.'
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described as institutionalized pure mistrust." 117 Nevertheless, the usual
limits of cross-examination, as well as any imbalance of resources among
parties, "restrict the free play of scepticism." 118 Most important, legal
institutions refer "to natural scientific authority in constructing [their] own
social authority," 119 and through judicial decision making, "the private
intellectual bloodbath of . . . court exchanges may be translated into a
more orderly account for public consumption." 120 Scientific knowledge,
that is, is "open to deconstruction and reconstruction." 121 Finally, to the
extent that there is a tension between the view that scientific knowledge or
method is superior to and capable of settling the arguments of interested
legal parties or advocates, on the one hand, and the view that scientific
"knowledge" is "capable of being manipulated to reflect and support any
interests which have the resources to 'buy' expertise," 122 lawyers and
judges seem to hold the former view. "Bought" or "manipulated"
knowledge is not science, and ideally is to be eliminated prior to its
introduction (in a Daubert-type hearing) or discredited during crossexamination.
The purpose of this Article is to identify a field of inquiry between the
extremes of an idealized view of science, in which social aspects (such as
institutional
gatekeeping,
professionalization,
consensus-building
techniques, and discursive regimes) are considered irrelevant, and the
conception that social factors (like funding, prior occupation, theoretical
commitment, and organizational affiliations) signal individual bias and not
expertise. The former view emphasizes core aspects of science such as
theory, data, test, conclusion, and publication and acceptance, while
eclipsing any substantial inquiry into the social aspects of science; the
latter emphasizes arguably social aspects of science but only as errors to
be eliminated. Neither view leads to a complex picture of the scientific
enterprise as a social, rhetorical, and institutional practice.
Consider again my catalogue of social aspects of science, as they are
presented in Diagram III to contrast with and replace Diagram II, which
downplayed social factors as eliminable or as merely background features.
Id. While sociologists of science accept that "scientific conflicts offer the most fruitful
examination of scientific knowledge in-the-making, because the adversarial pressure
forces the premises and conventions of each side out into the open," legal "contexts
could be described as a special case of this general type." Id. at 33.
117. Id. "Legal processes enshrine scepticism and mistrust: cross-examination has
a duty to question as fully as possible the adversary's case in front of the judge or jury."
Id. at 37.
118. See id. at 36.
119. See id. at 37.
120. See id. at 38. "Reconstruction from the ensuing intellectual debris is not the
expert's, but the judge's responsibility." Id. at 37.
121. See id. at 49.
122. See id. at 53.
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Under an idealized view of science that concedes the presence of the
aspects in Diagram III, but considers them usually irrelevant or even
admirable, and under the complimentary view that social aspects
otherwise signal eliminable bias, the features depicted are not likely to
be seen as important to legal evaluations of scientific claims. My
argument is that they are important because they are typical structures in
science, and could in particular cases be useful avenues of inquiry in
pretrial depositions or in cross-examination, and also provide useful
insights in drafting jury instructions. Significantly, I am not suggesting
that the presence of such aspects is especially, in particular cases, good
or bad. One can argue that the gatekeeping mechanisms of science are
good for scientific progress, and an attorney whose expert witness has
been attacked for belonging to a narrow school of thought could use
such an argument to reconstruct integrity.
On the other hand, institutional gatekeeping might signal impeachable
bias against novel but unpublished research. Inevitable aspects of
science, like language, instrumentation, theoretical commitments, and
funding sources are best approached neutrally, as though they may or
may not be significant, and as though they may be positive or negative
features, in a particular case. Consequently, an inquiry along these lines
might be as reconstructive as it is deconstructive. In any event, scientific
expertise will be presented as it really is, neither idealized nor as subject
to crass manipulation. Social aspects are neither uniformly wonderful
nor instances of eliminable bias-they are present, for good or bad, in
particular cases involving scientific claims.
David Malone and Paul Zwier, in Expert Rules: 100 (and More)
Points You Need to Know About Expert Witnesses, suggest attorneys
deposing expert witnesses always ask about opinions formed, what was
done to reach them, how it was done, why it was done, what
assumptions were made, whether there are reliable authorities in the
field, and what tasks were not done; other recommended questions
include what did the expert review and decide not to rely on, who in the
field agrees or disagrees with the expert, the Daubert questions (peer
review and publication, error rate, general acceptance, and testability and
replicability), who selected the materials reviewed, and who are the
assistants who collected data. 123 This approach, despite its typical
idealization of science and emphasis on individual bias (science is good;
it is scientists that are bad), begins to touch on some elements of
socialinquiry: (1) asking what the expert decided not to do, or not to rely
on, refers both to conventions in the field and to standards as to what is
123.
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worth looking into; (2) asking who selected the data to review (for
example, counsel), and about the assistants who collected data, refers to
the effect of expectation on experimental conventions, and to
professionalization, respectively. One could just as easily ask about
institutional funding for this type of research, policy or ethical constraints,
dominant models or theories, and limitations of measurement technology,
but a more informal line of questions similar to those used in
ethnomethodology (or conversation analysis) might reveal more about
the presence of such aspects. That is, asking experts to describe
generally what they do, who funds their work, where such work is done,
other scientists with whom they work or communicate regularly, what
gets in the way of progress in the field, and even failed experiments or
theories, will produce a transcript for analysis of social aspects. Again,
these conversational answers will not likely reveal intentional bias, but
innocent or inevitable bias, including cognitive or technological
limitations. Both at a Daubert-type hearing before trial, which permits
inquiry beyond "the four factors" (since the Daubert test is flexible and
not written in stone), 124 and at trial during cross-examination, the goal is
not only to dismiss or impeach experts, but also to understand the limits of
and constraints upon the methodology and results offered. Crossexamination along these lines begins to look like sociological skepticism
of scientific certainty-claims that are presented as natural or obvious
are seen as the product of consensus-building techniques, gap-filling
assumptions, experimental conventions and tentative models of nature. 125
See FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note.
Daubert set forth a non-exclusive checklist for trial courts to use in
assessing the reliability of scientific expert testimony....

124.

No attempt has been made to "codify" these specific factors. Daubert
itself emphasized that the factors were neither exclusive nor dispositive....
Courts both before and after Daubert have found other factors relevant in
determining whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable ....
Id.
125. See Wynne, supra note 111, at 33-34.
[S]tudies of scientific controversies have shown how scientific knowledge
taken as natural and universal by one school may be exposed as a tissue of
selective observations based upon a limited set of localized technical practices
and theoretical resources, and accepted inference bridges across gaps in
evidence, while partly leaning for credibility upon commitments to adjacent
bodies of knowledge which are similarly constructed. The whole edifice is a
network of combined social-cognitive commitments.... [Sceptics] can cut
away the apparently 'natural' warrants in these inference bridges and network
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As to jury instructions, Charles Kester has proposed that juries be
instructed to consider that all science is socially constructed and relies
upon dominant theoretical paradigms, unproven assumptions, and
communal interaction. 126 While Kester' s proposal relies on his own
questionable assumption that scientists understand and concede the
social construction of reality, 127 his proposal would make more sense if
juries actually had some evidence of exactly how science works as a
social enterprise. If experts were deposed or cross-examined on the
cognitive and instrumental limitations on their interpretations, the effects
of funding and cultural values on their work, the networks of persuasion
in which they work, the dominant theories and models to which they
ascribe, and the gatekeeping mechanisms of science, an instruction to
consider those matters in their deliberation would be meaningful.
N. SELF-CRITICISMS AND CONCLUSION

Because I have couched my otherwise theoretical, interdisciplinary
argument in practical terms, I anticipate the concern of practitioners that
careful attention to the social aspects of the scientific enterprise would
further complicate an already complex field of inquiry. Given the
numerous and lengthy volumes on how to conduct cross-examination of
expert witnesses, it is hard to imagine the subject could be further
complicated. Nevertheless, considering the social aspects of science can
be seen only as an expansion of the flexible Daubert inquiry, the various
bases for impeachment, and the suggested lines of questioning for crossexamination. On the other hand, the social studies of science on which I
have relied have as their goal a more accurate account of the way
scientists actually work and of the way scientific knowledge is produced.
I think it is more accurate, that is, than either (i) the idealized view of
science as exclusively anchored in nature (rather than, alongside nature, in
language, rhetoric, interpretation, values, social interests, and institutions)
or (ii) the deflationary view of scientists as variously greedy, for sale, or
crutches, showing the subtle social, conventional character of the knowledge.
Id.
126. See Kester, supra note 19, at 545-46. Kester proposes that juries be instructed,
in part, as follows: "Although this [qualified witness's] expertise provides the [witness]
with specialized knowledge, it may also have the effect of giving the [witness] a vested
interest in publishing certain papers, or in seeing a certain outcome, or in maintaining
[the witness's] status. . . . [T]he opinion stated ... was based on certain assumptions."
Id. at 565-66.
127. Kester claims that "realist accounts of verification and falsificationism have
largely been rejected," id. at 567, but I remain suspicious. I instead agree with Callebaut,
supra note 38, at xvi, that a "majority of philosophers . . . defend some variety of
realism," and that a naturalist tum is evident among historians, philosophers and
sociologists of science.
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precommitted to their corporate employer, their funding source, or their
favorite theory. The Daubert opinion itself, 128 though not revolutionary,
succeeded in establishing a new regime for evaluation of expert scientific
testimony, reflected in the new Federal Rule of Evidence 702, that is more
complex than the Frye regime, 129 all of which is justifiable on the basis
that scientific reliability is a more complex matter than "general
acceptance." And while the Daubert four-part test is not sufficiently
attentive to the social aspects of science, the flexible approach that
accompanies most references to the Daubert hearing anticipates new
factors that will become part of Daubert-type analyses. 130 Even without
attention to the social aspects of science, the test for reliability becomes
more complicated as new situations confront federal courts.
A related concern might be the effect of inquires into social aspects on
trial judges, who, despite the promise that they are given "considerable
leeway" as to how to conduct Daubert hearings, and when to allow or
disallow a particular expert's testimony, 131 are regularly reversed for
being too lenient in admitting questionable testimony, 132 or for being too
restrictive in disallowing potentially useful testimony. 133 Sometimes a
judge thinks a sufficient Daubert hearing was held, but an appellate
panel does not see enough careful and meticulous attention. 134
Sometimes the Daubert hearing is misused or misunderstood in the eyes
of an appellate panel. 135 Given that it is an abuse of discretion to rely on
128. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
129. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that
expert opinion is admissible if based on principle or discovery sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the field to which it belongs).
130. See discussion, supra note 125.
131. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999) ("[T]he trial
judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go about
determining whether particular expert testimony is reliable.").
132. See, e.g., Elcock v. Kmart Corp., 233 F.3d 734, 744-50 (3d Cir. 2000)
(holding that the trial judge misapprehended the gatekeeping requirement of Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 by admitting testimony of an expert based on an untested, novel
method; the case was remanded for a Daubert hearing).
133. See, e.g., Jahn v. Equine Services, PSC, 233 F.3d 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2000)
(stating that the trial judge "employed a standard of admissibility more stringent than
that expressed Federal Rule of Evidence 702").
134. See, e.g., U.S. v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306,314,324 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that
the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert on eyewitness identification
without first conducting a Daubert hearing; the dissent argued that the trial judge
conducted its Daubert analysis properly).
135. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 713, 721 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating
that the trial "court erred by relying on a single, potentially irrelevant, criterion to
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a "forbidden factor" in Daubert-type analyses, 136 what is the status of an
inquiry into the social aspects of science?
Questions about the effects of funding, persuasion, evolving instruments,
observational variables, and institutional gatekeeping would fit into both
the flexible Daubert hearing and into conventional cross-examination
techniques, but they are not a substitute for questions about core
elements of science-hypothesis, data and methodology-or concerns
about intentional bias on the part of a particular scientist. My point is
that in some cases, evidence of social aspects might be useful to
consider, for negative or positive assessments of the reliability of
particular testimony. Judges should welcome such useful, mediating
insights, but I concede that these are not the usual factors.
The greatest concern is one that has been identified in social studies of
science that engage in "epistemologically symmetrical" analyses. That
is, the social aspects of science have been used in traditional analyses to
explain errors or unscientific knowledge; 137 as scientific controversies
arise, one side is correct because it accurately describes nature, and the
other side's mistake is explained, for example, by funding bias, political
pressure, a corporate agenda, a faulty theoretical paradigm, or poor
training. Relativistic social scientists, in contrast, do not assume that one
side is correct, or on the side of nature. Rather, their epistemologically
symmetrical analyses assume that social aspects are at work in both
sides of a controversy. 138 However,
an epistemologically symmetrical analysis of a controversy is almost
always more useful to the side with less scientific credibility .... The side
with fewer scientifically or socially credentialed resources is more likely to
attempt to enroll the [neutral] researcher, whereas the better-credentialed
side views an epistemologically symmetrical analysis as threatening to its
cognitive and social authority, and it is more likely to react to the analyst with
hostility or suspicion. 139

In legal-scientific disputes, the risk of introducing the social aspects of
science (in depositions, Daubert hearings, cross-examination, or jury
instructions) is that they will become challenges to mainstream science.
In this Article, I have taken a modified "symmetrical" position that social
determine that plaintiffs proposed experts based their conclusions on methodologies that
are not sufficiently reliable to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
702").
136. See Powell v. AT&T Communications, Inc., 938 F.2d 823, 825 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the coun abuses discretion when relying "on a forbidden factor or failure to
consider an essential factor").
137. See Pam Scott et al., Captives of Controversy: The Myth of the Neutral Social
Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies, 15 Sci., TECHNOLOGY, & HUM.
VALUES 474, 474-75 (1990).
138. See id. at 475.
139. Id. at 490.
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aspects of science are not signals of eliminable bias, but that they are
inevitable aspects of the scientific enterprise, for good or bad. Social
aspects, like institutional gatekeeping or dominant theoretical paradigms,
can be shown to be positive supports for useful knowledge. They can also
be shown to be constraints on scientific progress. My conclusion is
neither that social aspects are always useful to novel scientific proposals,
nor that they are always useful to mainstream science. My conclusion is
that they are present, and that any inquiry into the reliability of a particular
expert opinion should include, alongside the core aspects of idealized
accounts of science and alongside the conventional notion of bias, a
careful consideration of the social aspects of the scientific enterprise.

305

306

